Abstract: Over the past two decades, the adoption of genetically modified (GM) crops has been moderate in Africa with mainly four countries, namely South Africa, Burkina Faso, Egypt and Sudan that commercialize such crops. While South Africa is set on the commercial cultivation of GM maize, soya and cotton, Burkina Faso intends to phase out its only approved GM crop (insect-resistant cotton) as from 2016. This paper analyses the genetically modified organism (GMO) regulatory experiences of South Africa and Burkina Faso as the two biggest African GM crop producers and highlights their similarities and differences as well as strengths and weaknesses in the light of their international obligations regarding biosafety. The paper starts with an overview of key international obligations on biosafety followed by a summary of the South African and Burkinabe GMO regulatory frameworks. It then compares main aspects of their GMO decision-making processes (their institutional framework, the scope of GMO-related activities covered, their risk and impact assessment mechanism, public participation in decision-making) and follow-up mechanisms (access to information through labelling of GMOs, post-approval mechanism, and liability regime for GMO-related damage).
Introduction
Africa is home to over 900 million people where hunger and malnutrition affect at least one in three people and where food production is decreasing. 1 Against this background, modern biotechnology 2 is said to have the potential to solve agricultural constraints but there are
A.
environmental 3 and safety concerns regarding genetically modified organisms (GMOs). 4 The opportunities and challenges that modern biotechnology offers for Africa's agriculture are highly debated. 5 Towards the end of the 1990's, the African negotiators of the Cartagena Protocol on Transboundary Movements of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs) (hereafter the "CP") 6 to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) intended to develop a biosafety model law to guide the development of African domestic biosafety laws. 7 The first version of the Draft Revised African Model Law on Biosafety (DRAMLB) was based on the proposal of the African Group for a biosafety protocol and was submitted to the CBD Secretariat in 1996. 8 South Africa nonetheless approved its first GM crops in 1997 before the coming into force of its legislation regulating GMO-related activities. 9 While the African negotiators of the CP took a strong stand against major genetically modified (GM) crop producers during the negotiations of this protocol, South Africa's position was to ensure that the contents of the CP would facilitate integration with its existing GMO Act. 10 The South African Developing Community (SADC) established an advisory committee in 2003 to set guidelines for GMO policy in the region. 11 The Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) are key players in readying their Member States for the commercialization of GM cotton, through harmonized biosafety policies. 12 A regional instrument has been adopted by the Member States of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) including Burkina Faso. 13 Over the past two decades, the adoption of agricultural biotechnology has been moderate in Africa, with mainly South Africa, Burkina Faso, Egypt and Sudan that commercialize biotech crops. 14 South Africa has a solid history of engagement with traditional biotechnology and modern biotechnology. 15 Burkina Faso has also been working towards recognition as Western Africa's leader in biotech acceptance before the country decided to phase out its use of insect-resistant cotton in 2016. 16 Research in agricultural biotechnology is being carried out in other African countries 17 but altogether African countries are concerned about the impacts of GM crops on their exports to the European Union (EU) which has stringent GMO standards. 18 In order to exploit the potential benefits of modern biotechnology while safeguarding against potential risks, most African countries signed and ratified the CBD as well as the CP. 19 only LMOs (which can be considered as a sub-group of GMOs according to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)) instead of GMOs due to a lack of consensus on the scope of products to be covered by the CP. 23 Both the terms "GMOs" and "LMOs" will be used in this analysis. This paper focuses on the South African and Burkinabe regulatory experiences as the two biggest African GM crop producers. South Africa is the world's ninth GM crops producer (2.3 million hectares) and Africa's current leader in research involving genetic engineering and GM vaccine trials whereas Burkina Faso ranks 14 th in the world and Africa's second GM crop producer (400 000 hectares) in 2015. 24 South Africa is a net food exporter although 2015-2016 has been one of its most severe drought periods. 25 Both countries adopted a GMO regulatory framework as a GM crop producer. However, the 1997 South African GMO Act 26 (hereafter the "SAGMO Act") mainly regulates GMO-related activities while the 2012 Burkinabe biosafety legislation (hereafter the "BFBL") 27 scientific studies yet it has been approved. 29 By contrast, Burkina Faso decided to phase out its GM cotton since 2016 due to the inferior lint quality of GM cultivars. 30 This paper makes a comparative review of the biosafety approaches of the two biggest African GM crop producers and their effects on regulatory decision-making. An examination of the South African and Burkinabe experiences with GM crop regulation arguably provides useful insights regarding the impact of GM crop technology and the adoption of GM crops in Africa. 31 This paper compares the South African and Burkinabe GMO regulatory experiences, highlighting their similarities and differences as well as strengths and weaknesses in the light of their international obligations regarding biosafety. 32 It first presents main international obligations regarding safety in biotechnology and an overview of the South African and Burkinabe GMO regulatory experiences. It then compares and contrasts main aspects of their GMO decision-making processes (their institutional framework, the scope of GMO-related activities covered, their risk and impact assessment mechanism, public participation in decision-making) and follow-up mechanisms (access to information through labelling of GMOs, post-approval mechanism, and liability regime for GMO-related damage).
Key international obligations regarding safety of biotechnology
The CBD recognizes the need for appropriate procedures to enhance the safety of biotechnology to reduce potential threats to biological diversity, taking into account risks to human health. However, it merely sets the stage for the development of such procedures. 33 It is the CP (also known as the "biosafety protocol") which provides biosafety procedures to ensure watch.org/news/latest-news/16677-burkina-faso-abandons-gm-bt-cotton (last accessed March 2017). 31 South Africa is still the biggest African GM crop producer while Burkina Faso was the second biggest African GM crop producer until 2015. 32 To the extent that the CP uses the term "biosafety" and not "biosecurity", "biosafety" will be used in this analysis; Biosafety refers to "the need to protect human health and the environment from the possible adverse effects of the products of modern biotechnology". See Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2000, p. 1. 33 Arts 16(1), 18(g) and 19(3) CBD.
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an adequate level of protection for the safe transfer, handling and use of any LMO resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on biological diversity. 34 Main components of a biosafety framework comprise a precautionary approach for the safe transfer, handling and use of LMOs; 35 an advanced informed agreement 36 (AIA) procedure; a risk assessment and monitoring mechanism; 37 competent national authorities and national focal points; 38 information-sharing and a Biosafety Clearing-House 39 (BCH); public awareness and participation in decision-making; 40 socio-economic considerations 41 and provisions sanctioning illegal transboundary movements. 42 During the negotiations of the CP, the identification and labelling of LMOs was heavily discussed. However, the CP was finalized with compromises on this issue. 43 Liability and redress for LMO-related damage was also addressed during the negotiations of the CP but with no consensus regarding the details of a liability regime. 44 The 2010 NSP provides international rules and procedures in the field of liability and redress relating to LMOs at the discretion of its States parties but it is not yet in force. 45 Unlike South Africa, Burkina Faso is a State party to the NSP and has already implemented it. 46 At the African level, the DRAMLB is not yet in force but has been recommended by the African Union (AU) Executive Council as a significant regulatory policy to guide national biosafety frameworks in Africa. 47 The precautionary stand of the DRAMLB on GM crops has been criticized as a de facto ban on GM crops by proponents of GM technology. 48 34 Art 1 CP. 48 Id, p. 11; See the DRAMLB's stringent standards on some aspects (GM labelling provisions (arts 14-15) and a 0.9 per cent labelling threshold for adventitious presence of GMOs (art 13(2)); finan-After this overview of main international obligations regarding safety in biotechnology, the following sub-section presents a summary of the South African and Burkinabe GMO regulatory experiences.
Overview of the South African and Burkinabe GMO regulatory experiences
Both South Africa and Burkina Faso have had ambitious modern biotechnology endeavours but adopted different approaches to the adoption of GM crops. South Africa proceeded to a rapid adoption of GM crops as from 1997 with insect-resistant and herbicide-resistant cotton, maize and soya. 49 By 2007, GM crops made up 62 per cent of maize, 80 per cent of soybean and 90 per cent of cotton cultivated in the country reaching 2.3 million hectares in 2014. 50 Current research using genetic engineering techniques focuses on drought-tolerant GM maize and pharmaceutical production from GM maize and GM tobacco. 51 The country has not officially started breeding, importing or marketing GM livestock but applications have been made regarding the approval of HIV vaccine, measles and tuberculosis trials involving GMOs. 52 By contrast, in Burkina Faso field trials with GM crops started only in 2003 and it allowed mainly the bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) or insect-resistant cotton. 53 Its economy is heavily reliant on agricultural production 54 with high climate risk and locust attacks and it is less advanced than South Africa in terms of research using genetic engineering techniques. 55 Both countries adopted a GMO regulatory framework as a GM crop producer. South Africa was the first African country to enact a GMO legislation 56 in 1997 before the com-
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cial guarantee covering liability (art 8(8)); community rights for GM free zones (art 21); public awareness and participation (art 7(2)); Liability and redress provisions (art 19)). whereas the SAGMO Act does not include this principle although its "Guideline document for work with GMOs" provides for a precautionary approach for risk assessments. 59 South Africa currently has a GMO decision-making process with GMO institutions, basic risk assessment and monitoring requirements for the release of GMOs, a public participation and information mechanism, a labelling regime for GMOs, and basic liability requirements for GMO-related damage. 60 As for Burkina Faso, the 2004 National Rules for Biosafety enabled the adoption of Bt cotton and other GM crops and the setting up of the National Biosecurity Agency (NBA). 61 In 2006, this framework was strengthened with a biosafety law 62 (hereafter the "2006 Biosafety Law") which was in turn, repealed by a comprehensive biosafety legislation in 2012. 63 By contrast, South Africa mainly amended its fragmented GMO framework. Burkina Faso has a GMO decision-making mechanism, GMO institutions, risk assessment and management requirements, a public participation mechanism, and a comprehensive civil liability regime for GMO-related damage but no standard for GM products labelling. 64 the "Guideline document for work with GMOs"); Department of Agriculture, Guidelines 67 The 2001 National Biotechnology Strategy was finalized after the introduction of GM crops in the country and before South Africa ratified the CP. 68 The Draft Biosafety Policy targeted the promotion of sustainable development, safe use of modern biotechnology and the reduction of its potential risks to human and animal health and the environment. 69 One of the strategic outcomes of the NBSAP targets an effective management and control measures to minimize the potential risks to biodiversity posed by GMOs. 70 By contrast, Burkina Faso does not have comprehensive policies on biotechnology and its experience with GMOs concerns mainly GM crops for non-food purposes. 71 Burkina Faso approved the commercial cultivation of insect-resistant cotton 72 as from 2007. Research was also undertaken on Bt cowpea and hybrid maize. 73 Due to insufficient production quality, local cotton companies planned to reduce the amount of Bt cottonseed to 30% in the 2016/17 season and return to non-GM cotton for the 2017/2018 season. 74 These companies are also claiming US$ 280 million from Monsanto in compensation for losses incurred since 2010. 75 
Comparison of key aspects of the GMO decision-making processes
This sub-section examines and compares main aspects of the South African and Burkinabe GMO decision-making processes (their institutional framework, the scope of GMO-related
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activities covered, their risk and impact assessment mechanism, public participation in decision-making) in light of their international biosafety obligations.
Institutional framework
Both South Africa and Burkina Faso have competent national authorities in line with the CP 76 and the DRAMLB, 77 comprising specific administrative bodies and consultative bodies as well as a national focal point to liaise with the Secretariat of the CP. In South Africa, the Executive Council of GMOs (EC), 78 National Scientific Committee on Biosafety (NSCB). 88 Certified NBA officers are competent to carry out investigations with powers of entry. 89 Altogether the South African regulatory institutions have relatively less members than the Burkinabe institutions 90 and no civil society member as required by the DRAMLB. 91 The South African DAFF and DEA, competent for GMO-related activities arguably need adequate coordination to ensure efficient handling of their different tasks regarding such activities. 92 A specific institution with civil society participation (such as the NOB) to implement programmes on the prevention of biotech risks would arguably help the public to understand such risks in South Africa. 93 While the NBA has increased powers in terms of independence and decision-making, the EC is subject to the Agriculture Minister for final decision-making. 94 Unlike Burkina Faso, there is no South African institution responsible to maintain and make publicly available a data base on GMOs. 95 To promote responsible decision-making, the EC could be made fully responsible if a permit is approved in breach of the SAGMO Act resulting in GMO-related damage. 96 Unlike the EC, the NBA's influence has been stretched to the region impacting on Ghana's and Nigeria's biosafety laws. 97 The main strength of the Burkinabe institutional setup lies in its specific institutions (NBA, NOB and NSCB) including civil society participation for a better sensitization and respect of biosafety. While the South African institutional setup involves specific institutions (EC, AC and the Registrar) as noted above, there is room for improvement in terms of independence, civil society participation and coordination of GMO-related activities.
Scope of GMO-related activities
Both regulatory frameworks include activities relating to the development, production, release, use, import, export, storage, transit and application of GMOs 98 but exclude the trans- boundary movement of pharmaceuticals containing GMOs in line with the CP. 99 In both countries, every GMO-related activity requires authorization by the EC and NBA 100 with a renewable permit. 101 They both comprise an appeal mechanism against a rejected permit application. 102 In both countries, illegal GMOs imported into, produced or used may be confiscated or destroyed at the expense of the operator in line with the CP. 103 Unlike the SAGMO Act, the renewal of a permit under the BFBL is explicitly subject to the respect of conditions under the initial permit. 104 South Africa has different GMO permits with different processing periods 105 while Burkina Faso grants the same permit for all GMO-related activities. 106 Any locally-produced or imported GMO in Burkina Faso is subject to an observation period in line with the DRAMLB whereas there is no observation period for such GMOs in South Africa. 107 Unlike the SAGMO Act, the BFBL explicitly does not authorize the import of a GMO that is prohibited in the country of origin. 108 Unlike the BFBL, the SAGMO Act does not comprise an advanced informed agreement (AIA) required by the CP and the DRAMLB for an informed prior consent to the first intentional transboundary movement of LMOs for intentional introduction into the environment. 109 The South African Agriculture Minister may prohibit GMO-related activities upon the recommendation of the EC by notice in the Government Gazette 110 while the NBA may revoke or suspend any GMO-related activity in the case of any new information regarding risks posed by the respective GMO. The NBA is mandated to communicate a copy of its decision on every application for a GMO permit to the BCH in line with the CP and the DRAMLB. 112 By contrast, South Africa has communicated decisions on general/commercial release and commodity clearance of GMOs to the BCH of the CP and not regarding contained use or transit of GMOs. 113 As from 2010, the South African Registrar is required to provide to the BCH, information including legislation, agreements, a summary of risk assessments, final decisions on GMO-related activities in line with the CP. 114 Both countries also provide a notification procedure regarding an affected or potentially affected State due to any unintentional transboundary movement of GMOs. 115 Altogether, the Burkinabe regime arguably has a better control on GMO-related activities with an AIA, an observation period for local and imported GMOs while being more transparent regarding the communication of all GMO-related decisions to the BCH. 116 As a State party to the CP, South Africa should include an AIA procedure in the SAGMO Act and better transparency regarding the communication of GMO-related decisions to the BCH to comply with the requirements of this protocol. 117 An observation period for local and imported GMOs in line with the DRAMLB would also improve the South African biosafety system. 118 
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Risk and impact assessment mechanism
The assessment of risks is required by the CP and the DRAMLB to evaluate the probability that particular hazards may occur to prevent harm and enable better risk management. 119 The South African and Burkinabe regulatory frameworks both provide that a risk assessment of the potential adverse effects to the environment, human and animal health is required before a GMO-related activity can be undertaken. 120 However, the risk assessment mechanism of the two countries differs in quite a few respects. A risk assessment under the BFBL includes the precautionary principle, 121 whereas III. 
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Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 50 (2017) the SAGMO Act does not mention this principle. 122 The risk assessment required for the GMO permit application under the SAGMO Act is nonetheless mainly a paper-based (drawing on research usually conducted outside of South Africa) and field-trial based assessment. 123 The EC examines the permit application before making a decision in consultation with the AC. 124 Unlike in South Africa, a risk assessment in Burkina Faso is undertaken by the permit applicant under the supervision of or carried out by the NBA. 125 The NBA takes the final decision regarding the proposed activity taking into consideration the recommendations of the NSBC. 126 In South Africa, the risk assessment submitted for the GMO permit process is undertaken by the applicant while an environment impact assessment (EIA) is not mandatory. 127 Even when an EIA is required, it consists of a basic assessment report, an environmental management programme and a closure plan. 128 To date, no EIA has been conducted regarding GMO-related activities in South Africa 129 but there have been reports of gene flow from Bt maize to non-Bt maize, impacts on non-target organisms, insect resistance development and irresponsible management in the country. 130 In Burkina Faso, risk assessments are categorized according to different risk levels 131 while the NBA may set up a simplified procedure in line with the CP if a GMO poses no significant risk for human health and animal health, biological diversity or the environment. 132 The Burkinabe risk assessment mechanism includes the management costs' analysis of identified risks and viable alternatives. 133 It requires not only a study of social and economic impacts but also ethical impacts. 134 Unlike the SAGMO Act, the BFBL prohibits any person with direct interests regarding the respective permit application from participating in the risk assessment 135 and the NBA may reject the application for lack of independence. 136 Further, the Burkinabe risk assessment mechanism evaluates GMOs in a category distinct from other plant products and subjects GMOs to a risk assessment based on their genetically modified character. 137 By contrast, with the requirement of a basic assessment report rather than a full EIA, 138 South Africa arguably equates assessment for biotech crops to the one which is applicable to conventionally-bred crops. 139 Until now, no adverse environmental impact regarding GM crops has been noted in Burkina Faso but adverse environmental impacts have been recorded in South Africa. 140 Interestingly, Burkina Faso has quality issues with Bt cotton but no quality issue has yet been raised with GM crops in South Africa. In light of adverse environmental impacts identified by scientific studies, a mandatory EIA prior to the release of GMOs is necessary in South Africa as well as the exclusion of any person with direct interests in the risk assessment to be submitted for a GMO permit application. Importantly, both countries should include the requirement of information from previous or current release of the GMO by other countries in the risk assessment report as required by the DRAMLB. 141 The assessment of socio-economic considerations arising from the impact of LMOs on the biological diversity is discretionary for States parties to the CP while the DRAMLB requires States parties to carry out such an assessment prior to the use or release of a GMO. 142 In South Africa, an assessment of the socio-economic impacts of a GMO-related activity is not mandatory unless requested by the EC when a GMO permit is applied for. 143 Until now, no such request has been made by the EC. However, studies have been undertaken by local scientists. 144 In contrast with the EC, prior to the release of a GMO, the NBA orders an assessment of socio-economic and ethical impacts on local or neighbouring populations at the cost of the permit applicant. 145 Some studies have also been undertaken on indigenous and local communities in Burkina Faso. 146 A systematic assessment of socioeconomic and ethical impacts prior to a GMO release would arguably be beneficial in South Africa and enable appropriate management of the consequences. Altogether, the main strength of the Burkinabe risk assessment system lies in the independence 147 and thoroughness 148 of the risk assessment to be carried out before the approval of a GMO permit. The main weaknesses of the South African risk assessment system arguably stem from the lack of independence and depth of the risk assessment submitted for a permit application. 149 
Public participation in decision-making
Public participation in GMO decision-making as required by the CP and the DRAMLB provides the opportunity to the public to make comments at a public hearing or in writing on a proposed policy, regulation or activity. 150 In South Africa, there has been no informed public debate or policy process on how to regulate GMOs. 151 The SAGMO Act was developed without adequate public participation, while the Draft Biosafety Policy was published six years after the entry into force of this act. 152 By contrast, Burkina Faso undertook better public consultation to draft its biosafety framework. 153 Both South Africa and Burkina Faso provide for some level of public participation in the GMO decision-making process albeit with different approaches as discussed below. 154 
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health effects, Journal of Development Studies 42 (2006) The South African GMO permit process requires public notification on a proposed release or commodity clearance of GMOs and not for confined uses of GMOs. 155 Such notification consists in a notice published in the printed media with a summary of the activity and a request for comments. 156 The SAGMO Act states which information may not be kept confidential. 157 Since 2010, the GMO Regulations require the publication of the notice in at least three national newspapers with information regarding access to the application. 158 Interested parties may submit comments within a period specified by the notice. 159 The EC has discretionary powers to consider public input before making a decision regarding an application 160 and may invite written comments from any person knowledgeable in a specific field of science. 161 In Burkina Faso, the NBA decides which information is to be considered as confidential after examining the permit application. 162 Before a final decision is taken on the GMO-related activity, a public consultation is announced in line with the DRAMLB and communicated by all legal means. 163 A public consultation is mandatory for any dissemination or release of GMOs 164 but discretionary regarding the import of GMOs or confined use of GMOs. 165 After the public comment stage, 166 the NBA informs the public of its final decision on the application. 167 The risk assessment report regarding a dissemination or release of GMOs is made publicly available in Burkina Faso whereas only a summary of the risk assessment is publicly available in South Africa. 168 While there appears to be a higher level of public participation 169 in the Burkinabe GMO permit process, there is room for improvement in both countries' process. In South Africa, interested parties have an opportunity to be involved in decision-making regarding the release of GMOs and commodity clearance of a GMO but not for contained uses of 155 Id reg 9(1). 156 Ibid. reg 9(1). 157 S 18(2)( a), (b) and (c) SAGMO Act. 158 Regs 9(2) and 9(5)( e) of the 2010 GMO Regulations. 159 Not less than 30 days after the date on which the last notice appears in the media. Id reg 9(5)(f). 160 S 5(2)(a) SAGMO Act. 161 Id s 5(2)(h) and (i GMOs. 170 Information provided in the public notice in South Africa is deemed insufficient for the public to engage with and the public has had limited say in decisions regarding GM crops. 171 The Burkinabe public consultation process is nonetheless not defined and would benefit from more procedural details. A legal duty for both the NBA and the EC to respond to relevant comments made under the public notification system with grounds for rejecting comments, would improve decision-making since it is unclear how far public comments influence decision-making in practice. 172 
Comparison of the main follow-up mechanisms
This sub-section compares the follow-up mechanisms (access to information through labelling of GMOs, post-approval mechanism, and liability and redress rules for GMO-related damage) that are applicable to GMO-related activities in South Africa and Burkina Faso.
Access to information through labelling of GMOs
The traceability of GM products is the backbone of biosafety regulation and access to information regarding GMOs through labelling is in line with basic sanitary requirements and transparency of methods of production. 173 South Africa produces GM crops for food and feed but also for non-food purposes, 174 whereas Burkina Faso produces mainly Bt cotton for non-food purposes. Labelling of GM food and feed provides information to the public regarding its GM content and enables the segregation of GM food and feed from non-GM food and feed during processing and storage. 175 As parties to the CP, both South Africa and Burkina Faso may request a label indicating "contains LMOs" to be accompanied by further information for all products that have been clearly identified as transgenic products in
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food shipments. 176 States parties to the CP should take measures to require identification documentation to accompany shipments with LMOs to be used directly as food, feed or for processing (FFPs) and indicate that shipments "may contain GMOs" and that they will not be introduced into the environment. 177 The South African consumer protection law provides a right to the disclosure of information to consumers regarding products on offer for purchase with specifications for product labelling. 178 Any good or ingredient or component containing at least five per cent of GM material approved for commercialization by the EC, needs to bear GM labels. 179 GM food with an enhanced-characteristic claim is required to use the wording "genetically-enhanced" or "genetically improved" foodstuff. 180 GM labels on food products on the market are nonetheless scarce while GM labels on animal feed are inexistent. 181 A labelling threshold of 1 per cent of GM material is nevertheless applicable for products to be exported with a GMO status certificate issued by the director of the Directorate Genetic Resources. 182 While South Africa has GM labelling standards, it does not have a threshold for the adventitious presence of GMOs as per the DRAMLB. 183 In Burkina Faso, all imported GMOs intended for intentional release or to be commercialized in the country are required to be labelled in a way which cannot be deleted or falsified. 184 The BFBL specifies that labelling obligations regarding GMOs are meant to safeguard ethical values and avoid risks to the environment, human health and animal health. 185 It covers two types of labels, namely "products derived from GMOs" or which "contains holders, complete information transferred to farmers using GM crops and enlargement of refugia requirements are necessary. 197 In Burkina Faso, the NBA is empowered to inspect, monitor or take any measure to manage risks with respect to GMO-related activities. 198 Unlike in South Africa, risk management in Burkina Faso involves different stages with obligations for the GMO permit holder 199 and the undertaking of a risk-monitoring study over a period set by the NBA. 200 The assessment of risk management costs and evidence of financial capacity as required in Burkina Faso before a permit approval 201 are important considerations to strengthen the South African risk management system. Under the BFBL, the developer of a GMO or GMO permit holder is legally mandated to recommend to the user of the respective GMO, precautionary measures and risk management measures. 202 Importers or promoters of GMOs in Burkina Faso are responsible for technical and financial assistance with respect to risk assessment and management. 203 There has been no adverse environmental impact recorded in Burkina Faso while the decision for the complete phaseout of Bt cotton is mainly due to quality issues. 204 With a slower and stricter introduction of GM crops in Burkina Faso, the Burkinabe monitoring institution has arguably been more adequate in its task than its South African counterpart. 205 South Africa clearly needs a better environmental post-approval monitoring system, a monitoring programme regarding such crops and a strategy to prevent GMO-related accidents. 206 
Liability and redress for GMO-related damage
Due to the possible interactions of a GMO that has been released unintentionally or illegally, it is important to have a civil liability regime for GMO-related damage. 207 While the CP only contains an enabling provision 208 for liability for LMO-related damage, the DRAMLB provides a set of rules for liability and redress resulting from the use, release and placing on the market of a GMO as well as a product of a GMO. 209 Liability and redress
III.
In Burkina Faso, a range of persons 220 involved in GMO-related activities may be the operator and the applicable standard of civil liability can be fault-based 221 or strict liability. 222 Fault-based liability is applicable for the user of a GMO in the case of negligence or lack of precautionary or safety measures prescribed by the developer of the respective GMO. 223 If the user of a GMO 224 has taken all precautionary and safety measures, the developer of this GMO is strictly liable for any damage caused by this particular GMO. 225 Strict liability applies to the developer of the gene or the GMO for damage caused by this gene or GMO. 226 Other persons involved in a GMO-related activity may also be liable. 227 The NBA is fully responsible when an approved GMO-related activity causes damage whereas the SAGMO Act does not include such provisions for the EC. 228 Joint liability may be applicable in both countries where several persons are involved in a GMO-related activity. 229 Unlike in South Africa, any person, group or private or public organization in Burkina Faso may take legal action and claim compensation for a GMO-related damage in line with the DRAMLB. 230 Under the SAGMO Act, the user of a GMO may be exempted in the case of GMO-related liability but the Burkinabe regime provides more defence options against liability. 231 Inspiration could be drawn from the BFBL to include an act of God or gross misconduct of the injured party or a third party as main exemptions from liability in the SAGMO Act. 232 The requirement of a financial guarantee to operate GMO-related-activities covering civil liability in South Africa as in the Burkinabe regime would arguably promote diligence in the use of GMOs as required by the NSP and the DRAMLB. 233 Burkina Faso's civil liability regime for GMO-related damage is a comprehensive one whereas South Africa provides mainly civil liability rules for such damage without specifying the applicable liability standard. 234 
